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WHACKINGt UNARMED WOMEN:
GAPS IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
MICHAEL F. NooNE*
When from 'ouse to 'ouse you're 'unting
you must always work in pairs -
It 'alves the gain, but safer you will find -
For a single man gets bottled on them twisty-wisty stairs
An' a woman comes and clobs 'im from be'ind.
Rudyard Kipling, Loot'
In recent years, legal commentators have begun to write on women in war:
usually as the civilian victims of belligerent forces,2 sometimes as military vic-
tims of discrimination within their own armed forces.3 Very little has been
written about women as belligerents.4 What has been written does not focus on
the legal problems conventional forces face when women are "unprivileged bel-
ligerents"' who fail to comply with law of war requirements for combatant
status.6 These problems can become acute when conventional forces are en-
Copyright © 2002 by Michael F. Noone.
t THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Joseph P. Pickett et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2000) ("'Whack'... slang, to kill deliberately; murder").
* Michael Noone, S.J.D., is a Professor of Law at The Catholic University of America. He was
a Distinguished Visiting Professor at the U.S. Military Academy and retired as a judge advocate
colonel in the United States Air Force. Thanks to Scott Silliman of Duke Law School for his contribu-
tions to National Security Law and, at Catholic University, thanks to Stephen Young, reference li-
brarian, who found the sources, and to Laurie Fraser of the faculty support staff who patiently as-
sembled the bits and pieces.
1. RUDYARD KIPLING, COMPLETE VERSE 407 (definitive ed., Anchor Press 1989) (1940).
2. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Women: The Forgotten Victims of Armed Conflict?, in THE
CHANGING FACE OF CONFLICT AND THE EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 23 (Helen
Durham & Timothy L.H. McCormack eds., 1999).
3. E.g., LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE MILITARY (1997).
4. See L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 103 n.6 (2d. ed. 2000) for a
listing of only three surveys concerning women as belligerents.
5. This term was first used by Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies,
Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 1951 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 321, 345.
6. L. C. Green summarizes the scope of the Forth Hague Convention regulations applicable to
international conflicts as follows, "Its purview extends to armies, militia units and volunteer forces,
provided they are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a fixed distinctive
emblem recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly and conduct their operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war." GREEN, supra note 4, at 35-36. Article 1(4) of Protocol I
Additional to the Geneva Conventions extends protection to otherwise unqualified combatants par-
ticipating in internal wars that are intended to exercise a people's right to self-determination. Id. at
61. However, the obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians remains. Id. at 356.
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gaged in "Small Wars"7 where unarmed women often serve as auxiliaries to
their unconventional opponents. Although legal sources have been remarkably
silent about these problems, a number of examples are available. I have selected
two involving unarmed women: one from Northern Ireland involving the Brit-
ish Army, and one from Somalia involving the American Army.
SCENARIO 1: AIDING AND ABETTING IN NORTHERN IRELAND
In August 1969, riots broke out in Londonderry, Northern Ireland when
Protestant Apprentice Boys clashed with the Catholic residents of the city's Bog-
side neighborhood. When the police were unable to restrain the rioters, the
Army was called in to maintain order and remained on the scene as political
violence spread to Belfast and to the rest of the province. Although the Army
sought to remain neutral, subsequent internment of suspected supporters of the
Catholic Nationalist community's Provisional IRA, without the concurrent in-
ternment of Protestant Unionist Red Hand commandos, increased tension.
"Bloody Sunday" (January 30, 1972), when Army paratroopers fired on an ille-
gal parade, killing 13 people (7 of them under the age of 19) and injuring an-
other 13, effectively alienated Nationalist support for the Army. An Irish jour-
nalist described the consequences:
It was not only gunmen with whom the soldiers had to deal. Women, too, could
be a major problem. In most areas their early warning system for the approach
of any stranger meant a general stand-to with the banging of dustbin [trash can]
lids and the blowing of whistles. Hundreds of women could gather very fast
and become a dangerous menace to a small patrol....
.. Of course the soldiers also got caught in 'public relations ambushes'-the sort
of 'come on' calls which would lead them blundering into old ladies or invalids
in wheelchairs.8
Did these unarmed women, acting in support of groups seeking to destabi-
lize the government, constitute unprivileged belligerents who could claim some
protection from international law? Certainly they could not claim combatancy
status (nor could their imprisoned IRA allies who sought but failed to achieve
POW status). If such incidents took place where the British Army could claim
the status of an Occupying Power, international law would provide for punish-
ment by internment or imprisonment, keeping in mind "that local inhabitants
owe no allegiance to the occupant, and any punishment must be proportionate
to the offence." 9 If the women were to face criminal sanctions, they would pre-
sumably be charged with some minor offense--disturbing the peace, or interfer-
ence with the police in the performance of their duties-and would be punished
accordingly. The "Yellow Card" that each British soldier carried, permitting his
7. The phrase is borrowed from British Major Charles E. Callwell's classic treatise. C. E.
CALLWELL, SMALL WARS: THEIR PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE (new ed., rev. 1899), and its U.S. Marine
Corps' counterpart, SMALL WARS MANUAL, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 1940.
8. DESMOND HAMILL, PIG IN THE MIDDLE: THE ARMY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-1984 76
(1985).
9. GREEN, supra note 4, at 263.
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use of deadly force, would not apply in such circumstances.' ° Similar Yellow
Card provisions limiting the use of deadly force to self-defense were to become
part of U.S. military doctrine in operations other than war."
The United States military's Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces
define national, collective, unit, and individual self-defense." The Army Manual
that explains the Rules of Engagement definitions notes that individual soldiers
have the right to defend themselves and other U.S. forces from a hostile act or
intent, the "threat of imminent use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit
against the United States, U.S. Forces, or other designated persons and property.
When hostile intent is present, the right exists to use proportional force in self-
defense to deter, neutralize, or destroy the threat."' 3 In this regard, the Barlow
incident, which occurred in Belfast in 1973, is instructive:
In one incident... a young soldier [Barlow] got separated from his patrol by a
group of angry women. They took his rifle and twenty rounds of ammunition,
calmed him down a bit by telling him that he would be all right, and kept him
isolated until an IRA gunman was able to get there and shoot him. The Belfast
Telegraph thought the incident reminiscent of tribal behaviour in more uncivi-
lized parts of the world: "Gary Barlow was a brave young man, he died hon-
ouring the orders of his superior officers, he played the rules of his Yellow Card
right to the end. Even as he was being mauled he did not forget to uphold the
name of the British Army, for considering the terrible circumstances, he still did
not open fire.""
Should Barlow have, after warning the unarmed women (which he pre-
sumably did), resorted to deadly force when they tried to relieve him of his
weapon? The law of armed conflict offers no explicit answer but articulates
three general principles for judging the legitimacy of a belligerent's acts: military
necessity, proportionality, and humanity.'5 Necessity is defined in the aggre-
gate, as justifying those measures not forbidden by international law which are
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as
possible.1 6 These criterion, clearly intended to evaluate command responsibility,
simply cannot be applied to an individual soldier in Barlow's situation. The
second principle, intended to regulate weapons and targeting, has no apparent
application in Barlow's case. Similarly the third, which requires that "[t]he an-
ticipated loss of life ... must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage to be gained," is inappropriate in this context.1 7 The U.S.
Army's expert on the law of armed conflict recently published a stinging attack
10. MARK URBAN, BIG Boys' RULES: THE SECRET STRUGGLE AGAINST THE IRA 71 (1992).
11. INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, JA 422, 84-95 (Mike 0. Lacey & Brian J. Bill eds., 2001) [hereinafter, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK].
12. Id. at 79, 91 (reprinting unclassified portions of the CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
INSTR. 3121.01.A, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES Encl. A (Jan 15., 2000) and the
March 31, 1995 Military Rules of Engagement regarding the UN's peacekeeping operation in Haiti).
13. ld. at79.
14. HAMILL, supra note 8, at 137 (quoting the Belfast Telegraph).
15. A. P. V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATILEFIELD 3-7, 14-19 (1996).
16. Id. at 4-5.
17. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 8.
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on the U.S. Rules of Engagement which, he claims, did not adequately inform
individual soldiers of their rights to self defense. 8 Although the article limits its
analysis to U.S. practice, we can say with certainty that an American soldier in
Barlow's situation might make the same fatal mistake.
SCENARIO 2: SUSPICION OF BELLIGERENCY IN SOMALIA19
The President of Somalia, Said Barre, was overthrown in 1991. In April
1992 the Security Council authorized the United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM), intended to monitor a cease fire between warring clans and to pro-
vide humanitarian aid. As lawlessness increased, the UN mandate was modi-
fied in August 1992 to permit the use of force to protect humanitarian aid. By
November 1992, the security situation had deteriorated so badly that security for
UNOSOM was turned over to the Unified Task Force, an international coalition,
which included U.S. soldiers and Marines.0 The warlords stopped fighting in
the Spring of 1993, the Marines were withdrawn, the U.S. Army became the re-
serve force, and an international force, UNOSOM II, was increased. Retired
Admiral Jonathan Howe, who headed the UN Mission in Mogadishu (Somalia's
capital city) decided that arresting a powerful clan leader, Mohamed Farrah
Aidid, and trying him for war crimes would enable the other clans to share
power with Aidid's clan. The arresting force, composed of Army Rangers and
members of the Delta Force ("The D-boys"), a detachment of Army Special Op-
erations, failed to capture Aidid and were trapped in the center of the city. An
intense firefight ensued:
Closer to the wrecked helicopter, a woman kept running out into the alley,
screaming and pointing toward the house at the southeast corner of the inter-
section where many of the wounded had been moved. No one shot at her. She
was unarmed. But every time she stepped back behind cover a wicked torrent
of fire would be unleashed where she pointed. After she'd done this twice, one
of the D-boys behind the tail of Super Six One [the wrecked helicopter] said, "If
that bitch comes back, I'm going to shoot her."
Captain Coultrop nodded his approval. She did, and the D-boy shot her down
on the street.
Then there was the woman in a blue turban, a powerful woman with thick arms
and legs who came sprinting across the road carrying a heavy basket in both
arms... Every Ranger at the intersection blasted her... First she stumbled, but
kept on going. Then, as more rounds hit her, she fell and RPGs [rocket-
propelled grenades] spilled out her basket onto the street."
18. W. Hays Parks, Deadly Force is Authorized, 127 PRoc. U.S. NAVAL INST. 32 (Jan. 2001).
19. The incidents are described in MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN
WAR (1999).
20. The historical narrative is based on Chris Klep & Donna Winslow, Learning Lessons the Hard
Way - Somalia and Srebrenica Compared, in PEACE OPERATIONS BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE 93, 94 (Er-
win A. Schmidl ed., 2000).
21. BOWDEN, supra note 19, at 217.
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Neither of the women were armed. In both cases, -the soldiers assumed that
the women were giving direct assistance to the enemy. The woman in the blue
turban's involvement was established after the fact when her basket spilled. We
are not told, but must be expected to assume, that the "torrents of fire" ceased
when the first woman was shot. Article 147 of the Third Geneva Convention
lists the willful killing of civilians as a "grave breach" which parties to the Con-
vention must punish.2 The soldiers would respond that the circumstances justi-
fied the act. But what if the spilled basket contained infant formula? What if the
"torrents of fire" continued? Their commander would probably conclude that,
even so, their behavior was reasonable under the circumstances and not punish
them. But the Geneva Conventions impose "an obligation upon states to punish
what the Conventions describe as 'grave breaches,' even if those states are not
parties to the conflict, the offenders and their victims not their nationals, and
even though the offenses were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the state concerned. " 23 At the Nuremberg trials, General Von Leeb was con-
victed of a war crime for permitting the shooting of civilians who were merely
suspected of belligerent acts.24 Thus, according to the Von Leeb precedent,
Captain Coulthrop and his men may be subject to prosecution for war crimes in
any country in which they travel. The charge? Shooting unarmed civilian
women on mere suspicion. The distinction between mere suspicion and prob-
able cause has long bedeviled U.S. criminal law. It may now create problems in
the international law of war as well.
These shooting cases create domestic law problems as well. If the women's
deaths could not be objectively justified--by diminished fire or RPG rounds--
Captain Coulthop's commander might initiate court-martial action for the sus-
pected war crimes. The Rules for Courts-Martial gives military authorities great
discretion in deciding whether to send a case to trial.2 If there were a trial, the
accused might rely on the doctrine of self-defense. The Rules for Courts-
Martial's criteria are clearly intended for peacetime homicides: reasonableness
of belief, imminent danger, inability to retreat, and the accused 'must not have
been the aggressor or provoked the altercation.26 The first two criteria would
apply on the battlefield, but it is not clear whether the criterion of reasonable-
ness is to be tested objectively ("Would the reasonably prudent soldier under
these circumstances have shot these unarmed women?") or subjectively ("Was
this soldier at the time he shot these unarmed women acting in good faith al-
though his act was objectively unreasonable?").
The scenarios that I have offered establish that shooting unarmed women
may not necessarily be a "grave breach" or constitute the domestic crime of
homicide. However, neither international nor domestic law offers soldiers any
clear criteria for deciding when such acts would be justified. Traditionally, this
gap in the law was unimportant. The international law of war was developed
on the assumption that war would be waged between belligerent armies who
22. GREEN, supra note 4, at 286-98.
23. Id. at 45.
24. INGRID DETrER DE LUPIS, THE LAW OF WAR 355 (1987).
25. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pts. 11-25, 11-31, 11-41 (2000).
26. Id. at pt. IV, art. 118.
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met criteria for combatant status. 27 Protection to unprivileged belligerents was
based on the premise that they would be acting in opposition to an established
state, which would be required to honor its international obligations as it sought
to suppress the insurgency: the Northern Ireland scenario. But what if the state
has failed, as it did in Somalia? It is generally agreed that UN peacekeeping
forces engaged in peace enforcement operations like Somalia are bound by the
laws of war.2" In failed states, however, the UN typically declines to assume the
role of an Occupying Power, thus leaving minor offenses, such as those com-
mitted by the "dust bin women" in the Belfast scenario unpunished and a con-
stant irritant for peacekeeping forces.29 Nor is there any published record of bel-
ligerent female auxiliaries being punished. If women participate voluntarily as
unarmed belligerents in a Small War where there is no civil authority to whom
they can be turned over, conventional forces are left with the option of shooting
them, and risking prosecution for murder or a "grave breach", or letting them
go free and risking further harm. Nowadays, Rudyard Kipling's soldiers should
continue to travel in pairs, but one of them should be trained in law.
27. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 29 -32 (1994) (tracing the shift of law as regulat-
ing the behavior of individuals to regulating the behavior of States); see also GREEN, supra note 4, at
28-30.
28. HILAIRE McCOU13REY & NIGEL D. WHITE, THE BLUE HELMETS: LEGAL REGULATION OF UNITED
NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS 153-175 (1996).
29. MICHAEL J. KELLY, RESTORING AND MAINTAINING ORDER IN COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS:
THE SEARCH FOR A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 172-181 (1999) (describing, then criticizing, the UN policy).
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